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abstract
After discussing the transformation of age-old agricultural practices that has been occurring since the
mid nineteenth century, and its impact on the natural environment, I identify four features of technol-
ogy that point to the ambiguity of the idea of “technological progress”. These are linked to the intrinsic
unpredictability (and uncertainty) of technological applications and have implications for evaluating
technological risks. I then show that large scale technological applications and innovations – such as
expanding the practice of smallpox inoculation in the second half of the eighteenth century – occur in
states of ‘technological exception’. In them, values are suspended and rules, limits and security norms
are absent; and, in the face of risks, losses and harm to health and environment that are occasioned by
technological applications introduced in the name of economical progress (development), normal so-
cial inhibitions become suspended in the name of furthering the values of capital and market. In addi-
tion, I show that maintaining technological exception has favored, on the one hand, the development by
large corporations of antiscientific practices that threaten the moral integrity (ethos) of science by im-
peding the proper use of the scientific method for evaluating the consequences of using technologies that
are protected by patents; and, on the other hand, under the cover of ignorance, continued deterioration
of the environment that threatens the very survival of the human species.
Keywords ● Technology. Technological risk. Pluralism of Strategies. Transgenic Agriculture.
Agroecology. Natural environment. Technical environment. Anti-science.
“Indeed the risk you run in purchasing knowledge
is much greater than that in buying provisions.”
Plato, Protagoras, 814 A
In this article I adopt the perspective of the model of the interaction between scientific
activities and values (cf. Lacey & Mariconda, in press). I consider particularly the ap-
plication of scientific knowledge, so that my argument moves between the frontiers of
science and technology. I discuss the complex relations and tensions between science
and technology, attending particularly to what is called post-modern technoscience
(cf. Mariconda, 2012), the predominance of practical and utilitarian interests in the
politics of science, technology and innovation, and the hegemony of the values of con-
trol and (economic) progress or development (cf. Mariconda, 2006; Lacey, 2010).
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My argument is not complicit in what Putnam (cf. 2004, chapter 8) denounced
as the “philosophers of science’s evasion of values” throughout the twentieth century.
Moreover, it rejects the view that values are expressions of personal and subjective pref-
erences that are completely distinct from the objective facts (cf. Mariconda, 2006),
and affirms with Dewey that “value is something that has to do with all of experience”
(Dewey apud Putnam, 2004, p. 135). Taking values into account changes the axis of the
relation between ethics and epistemology. It enables treating together the ethical prob-
lem of “the relation between personal freedom and the stable order” (Dewey apud
Putnam, 2004, p. 178, note 2) and the general epistemological problem of the rela-
tions of the objective and the subjective in experience, with the consequence that it
rejects confining ethics to the restricted sphere of subjectivity and so is able to recog-
nize the proper role of ethics in scientific and technological activities. The evaluative
perspective adopted is thus in line with the pragmatist outlook expressed in the for-
mula: “the knowledge of facts presupposes the knowledge of values” (Putnam, 2004, p.
145), that abandons the empiricist dogma: “facts are objective and values are subjec-
tive and ‘never the twain shall meet’” and accepts the challenge of considering scien-
tific and technological practices from both epistemological and ethical perspectives.
In the light of this stronger connection between epistemology and ethics, I will
address, on the one hand, epistemological questions about the unpredictability and
uncertainty of (mainly big scale) technological applications, focusing on a major ex-
pression of commercially oriented technoscience, transgenic agriculture and its risks
and impacts on health and environment (cf. Lacey, 2006, 2008) and, on the other hand,
ethical questions related to the antiscientific behavior of large corporations. I will con-
centrate on the environmental question because the destiny of humanity is at stake in
how it is dealt with (cf. Dupas, 2006, 2008).
1 The transformations of the natural environment in agriculture
The impacts of extensive mechanization and growing artificiality of the natural envi-
ronment produced by technology can be seen in a striking way in the age-old practices
of agriculture, which has been more and more transformed into a “technical environ-
ment”, one increasingly mediated by technical objects and actions. To Friedmann, this
transformation from a “natural environment” to a “technical environment” is gener-
ated by what he calls the “industrialization of agriculture”, particularly with the large
scale introduction of agricultural machines into the fields (furthered by the electrifi-
cation and motorization), that facilitated the widespread growing of monocultures (cf.
Friedmann, 1968, p. 9).
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This process of mechanization corresponds to the first stage of industrialization
of the agricultural field and to the profound technical transformation of the agrarian
natural environment, which furthers the tendency for technoscientific societies “to
transform agriculture into an industry in accordance with Ford’s definition of agricul-
ture as ‘an industry producing foods’ and the modern mechanical developments as ‘fac-
tories in the fields’” (1968, p. 118). Friedmann considered mainly the accompanying
transformation of fields into cities that is an integral part of the all encompassing in-
dustrialization process that began in the middle of nineteenth century and continued
throughout the twentieth century, and that was associated with a process of conurba-
tion,1 provoked by accelerated urbanization of peripheral zones of cities, where tradi-
tionally the plantations that supplied the cities were located.
Mechanization and urbanization of the field, however, constitutes only one as-
pect of the process of consolidating the technical environment – the establishment of
a technical stage that would be maintained simultaneously with later kinds of develop-
ment of the agricultural technical environment introduced from the 1960’s on. The
consolidation of this stage evidently occurred at the same time as the corresponding
transformation of the agricultural activity of producing food and also, significantly,
beginning in the second half of nineteenth century, of the discipline of Agricultural
Science into a specialized area of engineering, whose earlier phases remained closely
connected with working in the fields, but with later ones, following the advent of ge-
netic engineering, important parts of traditional agronomical activity, such as the se-
lection of seeds, would be transformed into laboratory and experimental specialties.
Meanwhile, two others stages would be added to this first stage of the transfor-
mation of agriculture into an industrial activity. (They correspond to the deepening of
industrialization by means of further mechanization and automation).2 One, commonly
called the “green revolution”, involves the introduction of industrial products of chemi-
cal engineering, particularly, chemical agro-toxics and fertilizers, used intensively in
1 The term “conurbation” is attributed by Lewis Mumford (cf. 2008 [1961], p. 559, 645) to Patrick Geddes, who
applied it, at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the urban agglomeration provoked by industrialization based
on the use of coal and that “not infrequently propagates itself as a mass of relatively uniform density over (…) hun-
dreds of square kilometers” (p. 559). Mumford extends the use of the term to apply it to the characteristic process of
the twentieth century by which little separated villages and the suburbs of great cities become aggregated in an un-
differentiated and shapeless urban mass in which there are no centers or an active urban life (cf. p. 632). He main-
tains that this generalized growing density and the propagation of the urban mass are no longer produced by “the
original forces that created conurbation”, the coal and the steam machine, but they “were supplanted by the net of
electrical energy, by the electrified railroad, and latter by the automobile and highways” (p. 645); and that conurba-
tion is the main force that “altered the overall equilibrium between urban population and agricultural population”
(p. 632).
2 For a preliminary discussion on the repercussion of automation processes in the world of work, see Holzmann
(2011), Ellul (1962), Merton (2013 [1947]).
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agricultural production with the aim of increasing economic returns rapidly. The other
is that of intensive transgenic agriculture, following the development of biotechnolo-
gies informed by genetics, and molecular and synthetic biology, in particular the de-
velopment of transgenic techniques which make possible the production of GMOs,
conceived as biological machines. (Chemical engineering of the second stage is deep-
ened by genetical engineering of the third; the development of specialization in Agri-
cultural Science shifts from the field to the laboratory, from agronomy to genetics, and
in the direction of experimental decontextualizing strategies).
Friedmann was preoccupied with a more encompassing characterization of tech-
nical environment that cannot be reduced to the impact of transformations in agricul-
ture, and hence in the natural environment. He takes the “technical environment” to
refer to “that environment developed in industrialized societies and communities since
the beginning of the epoch of industrial revolutions” – i.e., from the end of eighteen
century and first half of nineteenth century – in which “a network of complex tech-
niques tending towards automatism comes more and more to entangle human beings”
(Friedmann, 1968, p. 77). They include: productive techniques in industrial and in
agricultural sectors; techniques of administration and distribution; techniques of
consumption, including those that tend to transform domestic and family life; the vari-
ous techniques of transport; and the techniques of communication. In addition, the
“technical environment” brought with it a type of “psycho-sociological conditioning”
(p. 81), in the sense that this environment provides or facilitates a certain type of psy-
cho-social relation that tends to weaken social inhibitions towards the danger of ac-
celerated environmental transformations provoked by technological applications.
It is important to keep in mind – especially in the discussion of the intensive
introduction of biotechnologies in agriculture – that the distinction between natural
and technical environments is neither absolute nor strict, since it makes no sense to
treat human beings separately from their dialectical (mutually reinforcing) relations
with their environments; thus, the expression “natural milieu” refers to an environ-
ment that “since pre-historical times [has been] a relatively technical environment”
(Friedmann, 1968, p. 33; cf. Martins, 2012, p. 91-2). While domesticated plants and
animals, for example, can be considered as artificial to a degree, modified by the “tech-
nical” process of domestication, they are clearly outcomes of the biological co-evolu-
tion of organisms and environment, just as human beings are. But clearly, the extended
modification caused by technoscientific (anthropic) transformations of the environ-
ment trigger natural processes that fall well outside of the domains in which the tech-
nical capacity of control can be exercised, for example, the acceleration of climate
changes that are threatening the survival of the human species.
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Finally, this presentation of Friedmann’s ideas may be summarized using the
incisive formulation of Jacques Ellul: “the technological order has become the new and
specific environment in which human beings are required to exist, one which has sup-
planted the old one, that of nature” (Ellul, 1962, p. 394). I do not subscribe Ellul’s the-
sis of the complete replacement of the natural by the technological environment, al-
though I recognize that the natural environment in which we live is highly mediated by
technology and technical devices.3 Consequently to say that our (post-modern) socie-
ties are technoscientific societies means that science and technology are subordinated
to an economic order that evaluates and organizes them in terms of the likelihood of
their contributing towards high productivity, profit and capital accumulation, or to-
wards economic growth. Here, it is important to keep in mind that, while in current
technoscientific societies it is the economic order, that is, the economical sphere of
social activity, that serves as the vector that orders the technological system, in such a
manner that different technical bodies (institutions) or subsystems gain priority ac-
cording to their economical function (profit, capital concentration, market expansion
etc.), in other civilizations there are other kinds of ordering vectors. In Ancient Egypt,
for example, the vector is a transcendent metaphysical order, that of the possibility of
an eternal life for which this earthly life is taken as a preparation, in such a way that it is
the theological religious sphere that directs the hierarchy of technical systems designed
to constitute the technological device that guarantees the passage from this earthly life
to eternal life. The important concept which can be found in Ellul’s conception is that
of “technological order”.4
3 To say that we live in a technoscientific society does not imply that nature has been completely supplanted or that
the natural environment has disappeared, although natural tendencies are disappearing and being substituted or
rivaled by artificial tendencies of the social technoscientific environment. On the contrary, the acceleration of cli-
mate changes, hurricanes, massive floods, prolonged droughts, and other natural catastrophes, to which human
beings must adapt socially and organically, may be considered to be compensations of nature in response to the
technical modifications imposed on the environment.
4 In general, Ellul uses the term “technique” in a wide sense that involves “not only the ways in which one influences
things, but also the ways one influences persons” (Ellul, 1962, p. 394, note *), so that “technique” can be considered
as the near equivalent of “technological order”. But in some contexts, Ellul seems to use the term to designate par-
ticular procedures or technical solutions. In this article, I will use “technology” to refer to the system of techniques,
this is, to the set of techniques and technical normalizations or regulations, and I will use the term “technique”
when there is reference to uses and applications of particular techniques. Thus, genetic engineering is a particular
technique pertaining to biotechnology, that is, to the set of molecular and genetically-based techniques.
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2 Some features of technology linked with risk appraisal
Before analyzing the impacts and risks that follow technoscientific transformations of
agriculture and the highly artificial environment produced by it, in this section I will
point to some features of technology that are especially important for the ethical di-
mension of technological appraisal, as indicated by Jacques Ellul (cf. 1962, p. 412-21)
in the context of analyzing what can be called the “myth of technological progress”.
Ellul defends the thesis of the ambiguity of technological progress: “it cannot be main-
tained that technological progress is in itself either good or bad” (Ellul, 1962, p. 412),
based on an argument in which he maintains that “contradictory elements are always
indissolubly connected” (p. 412) to the development of technology. The thesis is mani-
fested in four main features of the development of technology:
(1) All technological progress exacts a price;
(2) technique raises more problems that it solves;
(3) pernicious effects are inseparable from favorable effects; and
(4) every technique implies unforeseeable effects (Ellul, 1962, p. 412).
I will now analyze each of these features from the perspective of its role in evaluating
technological applications in agriculture.
2.1 Openness and Closedness of technological applications
First, “all technological progress exacts a price” does not so much refer to a price in
money or in intellectual effort, as signify that “when technological progress adds some-
thing with one hand, it inevitably subtracts something with the other” (p. 412-3). Ellul
links this contradictory element to the fact that, “viewed objectively, technological
progress produces values of indubitable merit while simultaneously destroying values
no less important. Consequently, it cannot be maintained that there is absolute progress
or absolute regress” (p. 413).
I will adapt Ellul’s argument by saying that the development of technology is sub-
mitted to a kind of dialectics between openness and closedness of possibilities in
technoscientific applications,5 that is, between the new possibilities opened by new
5 My argument is freely adapted from (without pretend to be an exposition of) the anthropologist Gérard Chazal
(2007, p. 67-8). It is also related with what Feenberg (2009, p. 75-80) calls the “intertwined hierarchy of technology
and society”, in which there is a process of reciprocal construction between technology and society. Truly the two
aspects – dialectics of closedness and openness of possibilities and intertwined hierarchy of technology and society
– are both cases of an universal invariance which consists in the final analysis in the interactive relation between
organisms and environment or, to put it anthropologically, in the relation of humans and the environment.
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technological development, and those that at the same time are closed – so that in ex-
tensive technological applications generally, accompanying the realization of new pos-
sibilities, there is a reduction of possible courses of actions and consequently of choice.6
This means that decisions about implementing a technical innovation should take into
account (or be guided by) the dialectics between openness and closedness in a context
that makes comparison with possible alternative applications. Only by subjecting each
technological project to comparative analysis or examination can one identify clearly
the novel possibilities that may be realized and those that may be destroyed.
Consider, for instance, transgenic agriculture, clearly a product of technoscience.
It represents the implementation at large industrial scale of very specific technologi-
cal possibilities such as the application of transgenic techniques aiming to produce
seeds resistant, for example, to certain chemical herbicides. Hence, GMOs enrich and
expand the possibilities opened up by the Green Revolution that led, in the 1960s, to
the chemical industrialization of agriculture with the large scale use of agrotoxics and
chemical fertilizers, and to the increasing artificiality of technical environment in the
fields and generally in agriculture. However, in virtue of the intensified use of agrotoxics
in large plantations of GMOs, soil and water pollution increased and accelerated, in-
sect and amphibian diversity, as well as the variety of seeds of the species under culti-
vation, were reduced in function of contamination by transgenic genes, and reduction
of native species. These consequences add up to a dramatic reduction of natural assets
(which become ever more scarce with the advance of technical environment). They
also undermine the possibility of developing alternative technologies, such as
agroecology, that explore less destructive and more harmonious possibilities, and that
are more dependent on natural environmental assets, for example, the existence of
fertile, non-depleted, unpolluted, recoverable soils.
2.2 Technological problems and the role of alternatives in their solution
The second feature is that “technique raises more problems than it solves” (Ellul, 1962,
p. 412, 414-7). It involves that technology develops “by solving a certain number of
problems, and by raising others” (p. 414), which cannot be resolved by the same tech-
nique that gave origin to them, or that “there is never one technique, which solves one
problem” (p. 415, italics in the original). This means that applying technology to solve
problems is, on the one hand, a systematic issue that depends upon the set (or net-
work) of techniques that compose the whole system or the “technological order” and
6 In certain sense the most powerful instances of the effectiveness of human will in the world are also the ones that
narrows the space for the exercise of human will – a paradox that puts into question the limits of technical control of
the world.
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that can explore the technical possibilities made available by the system. On the other
hand, a technological solution is always a technical solution to a single problem con-
sidered by itself, so that the solution is decontextualized, partial, and very specialized,
and when used at large scale in the technical environment produces a series of effects
at various of its levels that require other techniques to be dealt with. This ambiguity
clearly points once again to the necessity of taking into account the range of possible
alternative techniques permitted by the technological system of a certain epoch.
All this can be seen as part of “the vast proliferation and diffusion of the techno-
logical way of life, diffusion that is as much vertical and intensive in what is called ‘colo-
nization of the living world’ (Lebenswelt), as horizontal and extensive on the planetary
scale: the technological monoculture” (Martins, 2012, p. 160). Thus, the predominance
of GMOs monocultures in the domain of agriculture is not surprising, it being an ex-
emplary case of technological colonization of the food system, that through extensive
and accelerated technical transformation of the environment, brings it about that
unpredictable and undesirable effects of the generalized application of highly specia-
lized techniques become consummated facts. These consummated facts are then used
to put constraints on ex post facto regulation, which again is always a technique, in vir-
tue of the technological environment in which they are inserted, and which consoli-
dates in the social order often irreversible consequences – including irreparable losses,
for example, connected with plant diversity and soil fertility – for the stock of natural
assets. There is thus a constant societal process of assimilation of the undesirable
consequences by means of which society adapts, through technical and juridical regu-
lation, to the environmental transformations so that efforts to introduce social and
ethical restrictions of undesirable or even bad technological consequences are inhib-
ited; this serves as a technological device to maintain the process of “colonization of
the living world”.
Evidently the above argument contains the tacit supposition that “only technol-
ogy can resolve the problems occasioned by technology”, because every technical so-
lution is introduced into the technological order or system, which is a network of so-
cial spheres (economic, educational, law), of areas (urban, sanitary, environmental),
of levels (local, regional, global), of scientific disciplines, and of technical specialties
derived from experimental knowledge that these disciplines make available. The tech-
nological system is therefore an open system that makes available a broad set of par-
ticular techniques applicable in the areas, and on which the successful applicability of
techniques depends on the natural and artificial assets of the present configuration of
technological environment. In this sense, even an alternative solution, which is envi-
ronmentally favorable and economically sustainable, is still a technical solution, and
cannot be otherwise. However, although the technological system is an open system, it
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does not escape being subject to the economic order; that is, the various technical pos-
sibilities are arranged in an hierarchy and favored depending on their contribution to
economic development and growth.
But to accept the supposition that there are only technical solutions to problems
generated by technology does not oblige one to adhere to technological determinism,
that is, that there is only one type of technique available that could deal with the prob-
lems generated by particular technical solutions, or in other words, by technical solu-
tions for problems defined inside artificially restricted contexts, that are experimen-
tally controllable (hence, rigorously decontextualized), and so produced within closed
technical sets of solutions. A technological version of the argument for the best pos-
sible world is insinuated here, one that Martins calls ironically the “theorem of
Panglossian existence”: “there are always technological solutions for the problems cre-
ated by technologies (especially biomedical and ecological problems)” (Martins, 2012,
p. 161). However, to consider this proposition as a theorem of technological determin-
ism depends on the degree of assent given to the suppositions:
(1) that the solution presented is the best possible solution, in fact, the only one
which is appropriate (and efficient);
(2) that “there are no alternative technologies that are appropriate, intermediate,
and with more favorable outcomes” (Martins, 2012, p. 160).
Both suppositions face great difficulties. Regarding the first, technical solutions
are inevitably incomplete, since they are solutions for problems defined within artifi-
cially restricted (rigorously decontextualized) contexts. When they are applied on a large
scale in the highly artificial environment of the technological order, they engender an
inevitable “residue of new social technical problems due to the incompleteness con-
nected with interactions and limitations” of the closed technical sets and of “their un-
predictable secondary effects” (cf. Martins, 2012, p. 162). The latter are the effects of
the large scale causal propagation through highly artificial technological environments
of specialized technical solutions, that is, solutions whose technical efficacy was nar-
rowly considered within the boundaries of the closed technical set to which they per-
tain, and so they generate other technical problems that have to be treated by other
technical sets:
(...) this thesis of the inextricable and unceasing chaining of problems, solutions,
and new technological problems (…) [implies that] new technological or tech-
nical-social problems proliferate more rapidly than solutions, and that the set of
residual problems become more difficult than previous ones due to factors such
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as the dynamic of technology, growing complexity [of technological system], in-
creasing costs and decreasing resources, exigencies for greater control, and the
inertia of social institutions (Martins, 2012, p. 162).
Furthermore, the tacit presupposition that there are no alternatives expresses
only a determinist understanding of “technical efficacy”. This can be questioned from
the perspective of the difficulties related to the first supposition and also because it
reflects the hegemony granted in scientific institutions to decontextualizing (experi-
mental and reductionist) strategies. Hence, it favors technical solutions based on ex-
perimental research of controlled causal mechanisms in the restricted environment
of the laboratory because these solutions involve the increase of control of specific ar-
tificial and natural processes of closed technical sets that compose our technological
environment. Decontextualizing strategies are not the only scientific strategies that
may orient efficient technical applications, however; and they are incapable of solving
the residual problems that propagate through other spheres of the highly artificial tech-
nological environment.
The solution of residual (technical/artificial and natural) problems, that are pro-
duced by negative effects or unexpected accidental consequences of specialized tech-
nical solutions, can only be treated by open technical sets that make use of context-
sensitive strategies or even of a plurality of strategies, for appraising the efficacy of a
solution requires taking into account the full range of both intended and residual ef-
fects of a technical application. Then, when making decisions about applying large scale
technical solutions, it becomes possible to consider alternative technical solutions that
balance economic with social and environmental efficacy.
But while the technological version of the Panglosian theorem of existence secre-
tes technological determinism, the market version of this theorem secretes economic
determinism. Following the neoliberal version of Panglosian theorem of existence:
Every problem caused by markets can be solved in a timely manner by more and
better markets (whether these problems are economic, social or ecological), and
not by non market behavioral patterns and models” (Martins, 2012, p. 163).
The argument for economic determinism depends on the same kind of supposi-
tions that are used in the argument for technological determinism, and whose diffi-
culties I have just presented. Regardless of its value as a determinist principle, how-
ever, the Panglosian theorem represents an attempt to close the cycle – technological
and economic – of the efficacy of technical solutions, excluding the possibility of al-
ternative technical solutions. Thus, in the economic version, the negative residual ef-
85
Technological risks, transgenic agriculture and alternatives
scientiæ zudia, São Paulo, v. 12, special issue, p. 75-104, 2014
fects of a technical application are considered “negative technological externalities or
non commodities (…), the environmental disasters such as the famous ‘tragedy of the
commons’ can be solved by market solutions and only by market solutions” (Martins,
2012, p. 163). This means that residual effects of technical-chemical solutions in agri-
culture, such as air and water pollution, should receive a technical solution compatible
with the economic efficacy, which limits technical efficacy to the closed agro-bio-
chemical technical set that is exactly the technical set that cannot be developed without
causing air, water or food pollution. These latter remain as residual problems without
an economically viable technical solution. Then, these problems tend to receive a mar-
ket solution: either insurance that pays monetary indemnities to those affected by the
irreversible consequences caused by the solutions of agro-bio-chemical techniques,
or transforming the question of pollution into an economic market, as in the case of
carbon credits.
Again, all this is well illustrated by the agricultural technoscientific solution in-
troduced to resolve the technological problem of producing food in chemical polluted
areas, by means of the accelerated artificial production of seeds and the expansion of
intensive monoculture, that generates a chain of effects such as increase of chemical
pollution in the environment, reduction of the variety of cultivars, decrease of insect
populations (or mutations that generate “super-insects”), disappearance of pollinators
(bees and others), degrading of ever more extensive areas of arable soil (and the con-
sequent necessity of expanding the frontiers of farmlands and the probable destruction
of the Amazon Forest), creation of conditions favorable to the appearance of “super-
weeds” etc. Furthermore, transgenic agriculture contributes to put pressure of soci-
ety’s capacity to deal with health problems such as the increase of breathing problems
in children and aged people, the continuing process of displacing people from rural to
urban zones – problems that can only be solved by other techniques available in the
technological order, or that are linked to another conception of technical efficacy.
2.3 The inseparability of beneficial and harmful effects of technology
The third feature concerns the effects and consequences of applying technologies to
the solution of problems. It can be expressed by “the thesis of the inseparability of
beneficial and harmful effects of using technologies”, which has an immediate conse-
quence at the ethical level. This thesis rejects outright the idea, which is basic and cen-
tral to much common moral thinking, that technology is intrinsically neutral, and that
whether it is used for beneficial or harmful ends depends on decisions made by its
users. This idea generates (in the light of the inseparability thesis) the illusion that
there need not be harmful consequences or that they can be cancelled by “good uses”.
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Consider the example of nuclear technology. Whether it is used for peaceful or military
ends, it is implicated in harm (for example, nuclear waste that must be kept under con-
stant surveillance since it is highly contaminating for a long period) that cannot be
ignored on the ground that it is intrinsically connected with the beneficial effects of
the uses of nuclear technology; it is impossible to generate energy for the good of peo-
ple without generating very harmful toxic waste. Another equally obvious example is
that of the use of genetically modified seeds, which cannot be used without causing
loss of diversity (variety) of the crop species planted.
This feature is particularly relevant to decision making about possibly imple-
menting dangerously polluting chemical technologies. Moreover, the thesis of the in-
separability of beneficial and harmful effects can lead to critical questioning of what is
commonly called “standard risk analysis”. It leads to recognizing that both the termi-
nology employed – “risk” instead of “harmful consequences” –, and the consequent
classification of risks as “potential” or “real” or “effective”, involve the presupposi-
tion that technology is neutral, for it produces manifest benefits, and only potentially
occasions risks (and harmful consequences). This presupposition is manifest once
again when evidently harmful effects such as the deaths of many people (as in the case
of the leaking of gas in Bopal chemical industries) or the demonstrated loss of envi-
ronmental diversity are called “real risks”, implying the supposed intrinsically ben-
eficial character of the technology, relegating the harmful consequences to the level of
error or bad use. This takes issue with the utilitarian (clearly economic) interpretation
of the concept of “risk” promoted by the large corporations, and the implicit reduction
of all value to economic value (profit or loss). Standard risk analysis is fundamentally
an organizational or management (technical) tool that serves for calculating the prob-
ability of economical loss in connection with the application of a particular technical
innovation, and of the corresponding costs of unpredicted residual effects of the large
scale use of products developed under experimental controlled conditions. In fact, it
is part of a technological device of power that, as we shall see in section 3, is exercised
so as to favor (make possible), always in the name of economical progress or develop-
ment, social reluctance to address the negative consequences of technology (cf. Fressoz,
2012; Agamben, 2007).
2.4 Unpredictability and uncertainty of technological applications
The fourth feature of the ambiguity of technological progress is expressed in an uni-
versal mode by Ellul: “all technological progress contains unforeseeable effects” (1962,
p. 419). When new technical means and new technological solutions are discovered,
they are applicable to precisely delimited technical spheres (facts) in such a way that
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certain results (effects) are expected and obtained. However, in virtue of the highly
artificial environmental and the (open) interactions of the expected effect with the to-
tality of effects of the system “there are always secondary effects that were not antici-
pated, and that in the first stage of the technical progress in question could not in prin-
ciple have been anticipated” (p. 419-20). This unpredictability could be avoided only
if the complete experimental exploration of all possibilities permitted by the techno-
logical system at every moment were possible, and obviously it is not.
Note, in the first place, that this points to a strong link between predictability
and experimental control. Unpredictability means that we are dealing with variables
that were not taken into account in the experimental design which leads to a particular
technical development. In second place, since the aim of technology is to control tech-
nically the events that occur in the world, complete predictability, that is, the possibil-
ity of conducting experiments concerning all objects and dimensions of the techno-
logical system (the “complete possibility of experimenting in every sphere”) remains
as an ideal, which maintains, on the one hand, relations of mutual reinforcement with
the value of control, but imposes, on the other hand, the recognition of the limits
(boundaries), sometimes very narrow, to which technical solutions are subjected.
Ellul illustrates the thesis of technological unpredictability by means of exam-
ples of unpredictable effects in three technological spheres: pharmaceuticals and chem-
istry; urbanism; agriculture. (This will give us the opportunity of returning to the re-
flection on the transformations of natural into a technical environment.)
Concerning pharmaceutical and chemical technologies, Ellul discusses three
cases: aspirin, DDT and thalidomide. Aspirin has remarkable effects connected with
eliminating headaches, but its prolonged ingestion has the undesirable collateral ef-
fect of increasing susceptibility to severe hemorrhages. DDT, the first agrotoxic used
extensively and intensively, was considered in 1945 to be “a prodigiously successful
means for the destruction of all kinds of vermin and insects” (Ellul, 1962, p. 420) and
absolutely innocuous to human beings. But, when consequently it was intensively ap-
plied on the surface of the planet, it turned out to have the unpredicted secondary ef-
fect of causing anemia in animals and in humans. Regarding thalidomide, Ellul just
mentions its terrible genetic and teratological effects, and reiterates that “identical
problems [that is, of producing harmful collateral effects] are potentially raised by all
chemicals consumed by animals or men” (p. 420). The upshot of this discussion is the
following characterization of secondary (collateral) effect:
secondary [collateral] effects: effects which are essentially unpredictable and only
revealed after the technique in question has been applied on a grand scale (…)
(Ellul, 1962, p. 420).
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This characterization of collateral effects is relevant for the exercise of the Precaution-
ary Principle and points again to the necessity for more scientific research on the col-
lateral effects of the continued use of drugs and of toxic substances on animal and hu-
man health, in order to anticipate those effects that are unpredictable in the short term.
(Obviously, the health of plants, animals, and humans are linked by the food chain,
and polluted air and water undermine environmental health.)
Another kind of technological unpredictability is found in the urban dimension
of the technical environment, more directly linked with psycho-sociological effects
on the behavior of the inhabitants of large cities, because in the urban planning we are
very specially “confronted with the effect of the technological environment on human
beings” (Ellul, 1962 p. 420). In large cities, feelings and sensations of isolation, lone-
liness, absence of human contacts, physical and mental stress, fear of violence, etc, are
common. Large scale urban projects, like those of Le Corbusier, that were based on the
diagnosis that these problems originate in the fact that “big cities dwellers do not know
one another”, and that, in order to favor human contact and redirect the psycho-so-
ciological effects, involved the construction of “large blocks of dwellings where people
could meet one another as they would in small cities, with everything (grocer, baker,
butcher) included in the block so that people would get to know one another and a com-
munity would come into being (...)” (Le Corbusier apud Ellul, 1962, p. 420). However,
the psycho-sociological result of constructing the large housing blocks, instead of be-
ing a return to an idealized community life inspired in villages, was the opposite of that
predicted, for the problems of solitude and isolation became aggravated by the signifi-
cant increase of violence that erupted in these urban agglomerations. In fact the con-
struction of large housing and residential blocks ended up being integrated into a tech-
nological device aiming to solve two basic urban problems: housing and locomotion.
Many programs of slum (“favela”; “villa-miseria”) removal in Latin America followed
this model of construction of big agglomerates of housing blocks. This solution also
produced part of the process of suburbanization on the peripheries of large cities, and
the destruction of natural environments as well as the reduction of productive farm-
lands (cf. Mumford, 2008 [1961], cap. 16-17).
The other part of the process of urbanizing rural areas was a consequence of the
overwhelming predominance of automobile; and, in American countries, the predomi-
nance of transport moved by burning fossils fuels led to constructing a network that
inter-linked cities based on roads and freeways that cut through rural zones, many of
which are dedicated to food production. It led also to an urban network of avenues,
tunnels, bridges, viaducts and parking lots that clearly prioritizes the individual auto-
mobile (cf. Mumford, 2008 [1961], cap. 17). This huge technological system of trans-
port enabled the urbanization of the rural areas increasingly distant from the suburbs
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of large cities by means of developing urban projects – promoted by the construction
business and directed towards the middle class – that create gated communities with
controls on the entry and exit of people, and that often transform farms and fertile and
arable lands into urban condominiums (cf. Mumford, 2008 [1961], cap. 16). From the
psycho-social point of view, this kind of model of community, far from allowing a life
closer to nature, supposedly calmer, more balanced, and favorable to rest and leisure,
ends up producing unexpected difficulties, and becoming a source of physical and
mental stress. On the one hand, people living in these artificially created communities
tend to generate a psychological environment of suspicion and censorship, in which
“people are perpetually under the eyes and the surveillance of their neighbors” (Ellul,
1962, p. 421). On the other hand, the growth of rural urbanization leads rapidly to traf-
fic jams at the entrance points of the great cities, requiring more and more time to
travel between one’s distant residence and work place in the city. This example shows
how urban planning solutions, broadly technical ones from the economic, managerial
and engineering point of view, can produce unexpected and even psycho-social conse-
quences that are contrary to those expected.
Intensive conventional agriculture, “the massive cultivation of certain plants like
corn and cotton” (p. 421), practiced in the United States, Brazil, Russia, and Argentina
among other countries, provides Ellul’s third example of unpredicted effects of large
scale technological applications. From the technological point of view, the extensive
plantations (monocultures) of corn and cotton have represented economic progress
because they produced an enormous increase in productivity. Deforestation also re-
sulted in economic progress, doubly profitable because of commercialization of woods
from the destroyed forest and opening up new areas for cultivation and hence produc-
tivity. However, it was not anticipated (predicted)
that corn and cotton are plants which not only impoverish the soil, but even an-
nihilate it by the twofold action of removing certain natural elements and de-
stroying the relation between humus and the soil particles. Both are destroyed
by the roots of cotton and corn to the extent that, after 30 or 40 years of cultiva-
tion of these agricultural products, the soil is transformed into a veritable dust
bowl. A strong wind need only to pass over it to reduce it to bare rock (Ellul, 1962,
p. 421).
Intensive agriculture has similarities with the first example of pharmaceutical
and chemical products. Once again there is an unpredictable (in the short term) col-
lateral effect that becomes manifest only when the technological solution is applied at
large scale over a long period of time, in this case, thirty or forty years. What the second
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and third examples have in common is that they are part of the same process of techni-
cal transformation of the rural environment that results in the continuing decrease of
fertile areas that could be used for production of food at small scale in the peripheral
areas of large cities. In addition, in the huge productive areas of the interiors of Ameri-
can countries, the disaster of green revolution, which in part is pertinent to Ellul’s
examples of corn and cotton, is transformed by transgenic agriculture into a catastro-
phe for the environment and health. The large scale applications of chemical, genetic
and biochemical solutions greatly increase the negative collateral effects on the envi-
ronment, what the economists call “environmental externalities”, obliging an increase
of social tolerance to risks and harmful consequences. There is an acceptation that the
environmental externalities of large scale technological applications, such as reduced
water resources, chemical pollution and soil infertility, the residual cumulative effects
of continuous ingestion of GMOs etc. are the price that we have to pay for progress,
modernization, development and, more recently, innovation.
There is a powerful compensatory mechanism (that removes social inhibitions)
that generates continuous adaptation between the transformations of the technologi-
cal environment and the social practices that unfold in it. This mechanism is a techni-
cal device that has the components: standard risk analysis; insurance against damage
and risks, and regulation of techniques, that is, the introduction of technical codes
and legislation about the limits of use and application of certain techniques. The func-
tion of this procedure is to engender acceptance that, although the techniques may
have dangerous or harmful effects, their benefits justify having tolerance to the risks
they occasion.7
3 Technological risks and the state of technological exception
There is a precise anthropological sense in which the complementary relation between
humans and the environment in which they live is what defines humanity. The human
is its environment; and the environment in which humans beings live is the measure
of human intervention in nature; and the degree of artificiality of the environment is
in the final analysis the measurable expression of our separation from nature. The fur-
ther the transformation of the natural into a technical and artificial environment pro-
ceeds, the more we subject ourselves to the unpredictable (in the short term) conse-
quences of technology and to the uncertainty of our partial technical solutions, and, as
7 There is no space here to deal with the economic consequences of technological unpredictability and, in particu-
lar, of the economical aversion to uncertainty (cf. Martins, 2012, cap. 5, p. 180-8).
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in the case of agriculture where biotechnological and chemical solutions are applied at
large scale, we run the risk of environmental and health catastrophes and losing natu-
ral assets to such an extent that we even endanger the survival of the human species.
Technoscientific agriculture confronts us with “the violence of danger that eliminates
all protective zones and all modern differentiations” (Beck, 2010 [1986], p. 7). I will
deal with this notion of “risk” that is used to characterize society in the present state of
development of technology.
In a simple way, “risk” is synonymous to “danger”, in other words, risk expresses
the possibility of danger, that is, it expresses the high probability of the occurrence of
an inconvenient effect or a fatality, whose occurrence cannot be controlled by the same
particular technical solution which make possible that particular technical action or
application. Risk also applies to the unpredictable (in the short term) consequences
and to the residual effects (produced by the effect of causal propagation through the
technological environment) of technical solutions applied at large scale.
“Risk” is an anthropocentric notion, from which follows its ethical dimension,
for it would not be risk without human implication, without some kind of technical
action (cf. Bourg, 2007, p. 123) on the environment, without having repercussion on
what is to be an human in such an environment. This is why in the dimension of hu-
man social organization the notion of “risk” acquires an important juridical sense, ac-
cording to which in insurance contracts, risk is understood as an incident (an eco-
nomic loss, a physical or material harm) which demands indemnity. Risk, in the
juridical sense, refers then to the responsibility or the duty related to the loss or harm
caused by a technical action that produces such a risk situation. In the economic sense,
however, a risk is evaluated by the economic (cost/benefit) standard risk analysis, and
it can be defined as the association between an eventuality (probability of economic
profit in an technological endeavor or application) and a vulnerability (probability of
harm to people, individual goods or society; harms that evidently will result in losses
to be covered be insurance or paid by monetary indemnities) (cf. Bourg, 2007; Dusek,
2009, p. 89-97).
The philology of the word “risk” is clarifying. The term appears in the West in
the middle of twelfth century, when Pisa and Genoese merchants borrowed from “arabic
the word ‘rizq’ (‘the part that God attributes to each men’) to designate in their con-
tacts the losses and profits linked to uncertain events” (Fressoz, 2012, p. 27), that is, to
increase the profits and diminish the losses (or insured part of these) in function of
danger. Throughout the fifteenth century the term “risk” was in regular use among
Portuguese and Spanish navigators in connection with financing the technical and eco-
nomic adventure represented by great feats of navigation and by the colonization of
America. This means that the insurance system linked to economic risk, as well as the
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accounting system registering receipts and payments, were part of mercantile capital-
ism, long before risk was incorporated in the insurance system of industrial capital-
ism during the chemical revolution of eighteenth century and its technical application
on a large scale during the first industrial revolution after the French Revolution.
Maybe it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who first used the term in the sense of the
expression “technological risk” referring not only to the economic sense of insurance,
but applying it to the urban planning (technical) conception of the cities. Differing
from Voltaire’s revolt against the “violence of nature” in the earthquake that destroyed
Lisbon in 1755, Rousseau maintained that the responsibility was in greater part human,
attributing the catastrophe to the risk to which inhabitants of Lisbon had exposed them-
selves for “having grouped twenty thousand dwellings of six or seven floors” (Rousseau
apud Bourg, 2007, p. 123-4); and many people had died looking for their belongings,
an attitude that reveals the ignorance of the danger to which they were exposed.
During the historical process of constitution of the technological system – which
is a fundamental part of the process of scientific-technological rationalization of mod-
ern societies that has continued from the mid eighteenth century until today – there
was consolidated a social perception of risk, molded in a technical-economic concep-
tion of the same risk. This conception is based in the standard risk analysis, which is
an instrument of the economic rationalization of profits and losses being part of a tech-
nological device – in major part mathematical, constituted by probability, statistics,
game theory and rational decision theory – that enables the direct technological dan-
gers and its eventual negative social and environmental consequences to be absorbed
by the market. This is done by the financial and actuarial processes of insurance that
have accompanied industrialization since the first Industrial Revolution until the
chemical and biotechnological industrialization of present agribusiness.
If we look at the great technological interventions that marked the transforma-
tion of the natural environment into the present technological order, an environment
more populated by technical objects and even artificial living beings, we can detect
the mechanism by which the negative consequences and residual effects are assimi-
lated, and come to be considered as acceptable (natural, inevitable) integral parts of
the environment. This technological device makes viable a process of social adapta-
tion to technology and to the risks, harms to health and environment that it occasions,
that are incorporated by means of what Fressoz calls “the ontological form of the mod-
ern neutralization of inhibition”, taken in the sense of “the set of descriptions that aim
to adjust the world to the technological imperative” (Fressoz, 2012, p. 286) of mod-
ernization and economic development. And, in fact, the neutralization of social
inhibition seems to be more effective when it is established “in the immediacy of the
relation between the world and the techniques” (p. 286), because in this manner it
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obtains the aim to “weaken the technological impact and neutralize the critical sense
of the accidents, in order to capture, orient and align the perceptions and the behaviors
in the sense of technique” (p. 287). There is then a constant process of social neu-
tralizing of inhibition by which risks and accidents, intrinsically linked with technical
solutions and applications, are incorporated as parts of certain technical sets of the
technological order, and in this manner after a long period of regulation – which can
never be completed – become normal, controllable within certain parameters, and so
are neutralized in the technological order; at the same time social inhibitions con-
cerning risks are weakened in view of modernization, technological progress and eco-
nomic development.
Furthermore, the process of gradual construction of the technological system
that is composed by the network of technical devices embodies a historical systemic
invariant, namely, the exceptionality of the social, health and environmental situation
created by every new large scale application of technical solutions – a state of techno-
logical exception (that in itself does not require explanation, and that is tacitly taken
for granted), in which values and “the traditional norms that rule health, property,
environments, imputations of harms, and responsibilities” (Fressoz, 2012, p. 288) are
suspended. In this exceptional state, certain matters concerning artificial beings, new
technical devices of control, and the inevitability of residual or even bad effects of tech-
nological solutions are able to become consummated facts. While the state of techno-
logical exception endures, incessantly more and more of such consummated facts about
environmental, social and health risks are created, and they have impact in juridical
debates and ex post factum technical regulation of its limits. The state of technological
exception corresponds, then, very significantly to the maintenance of a state of sus-
pension of rules, laws and established order, to a suspension of social and ethical val-
ues and particularly, as we shall see in section 4, to suspension of the values of scien-
tific ethos, thus to adopting an antiscientific posture. It authorizes the execution of an
open-ended process of experimentation that always involves increasing the technical
component of the environment, and that produces effects and consequences which
are very far from being predicted, controlled or avoided.
The juridical manner of solving the state of technological exception consists in
closing the technological cycle by means of regulations on (for example) the new arti-
ficial living beings, and on the procedures, dangers, accidents or harms caused by them.
Beginning with recognizing the consummated facts generated by technology, techni-
cal and juridical regulation “redefines the stuff of the world, the beings that compose
it, and its regularities, redefining equally the technical forms” (p. 290). However, rec-
ognizing a consummated technical fact imposes on science the task of describing and
explaining it with the intent of absorbing the exception, setting its limits, and neutral-
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izing its effects in the technological order. Therefore, science and also technique give
rise to a procedure of expertise – that supposes a specialized knowledge not only about
the disputed matter but also in the process of regulation – by which technology ends up
imposing a technical regulation on society, instead of society establishing the social,
sanitary and environmental limits of technology. Observe that the process of regula-
tion occurs for the most part in a state of exception and, consequently, of suspension of
habitual normative practices, and that it concludes with the normalization of the ex-
ception (cf. Fressoz, 2012, p. 289). So, the closed cycle of technical and juridical regu-
lations – which goes from the state of technological exception, in which are generated
the technological consummated facts, to the conclusion of technical and juridical regu-
lation – gradually prepares the process of weakening social inhibitions concerning
risks, that is, the adjustment of society to the exception by turning it into the “nor-
mal”, based on the imperative of technological progress and economical development.
This cycle – state-of-technological-exception/consummated-facts/regulation –
can be seen as an invariant component of the historical development that brought about
the gradual implementation, from the 1750s on, of the technological order, the intro-
duction of the scientific mentality in the productive system, and gradually in more sec-
tors of society. Modernization and technological progress – that correspond to the ad-
vance of scientific rationality and of the bureaucratic order in society – is found in the
hygienist movement of prevention of smallpox that agitated France, England and the
United States from the middle of eighteenth century, and that is undoubtedly the first
large scale application (in public health) of a medical technique derived from the medi-
cal study of infectious deceases. The movement began with the discovery that the in-
oculation of the pus from the pustule of smallpox could make a person immune to the
disease; and led, in the course of the campaign to combat smallpox, following an inter-
nal technical development, to the discovery of the vaccine and to the technical develop-
ment of its production, conservation and use in inoculation. In this very large scale
experiment with human populations, conducted sometimes far away from controllable
conditions, epidemics broke out and, during a long period of time until the stabilization
of the vaccination technology, the smallpox inoculation produced many death and,
among those immunized, many collateral effects, such as blindness and (most com-
monly) deformations in the inoculated limb. This huge experiment conducted on the
civil population generated revolts and resistance that lasted until the technique was
stabilized, its efficacy was proven, and it was regulated as an acceptable (even desir-
able) practice of public health that could be imposed on the population by the force of
the law. In this case, one can see a clear neutralization of inhibitions in the face of
dangers and harm occasioned by these sanitary campaigns, in the name of the moderni-
zation of society and medical and health related progress (cf. Fressoz, 2012, cap. 1-2).
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One can find the same cycle at the very beginning of the first Industrial Revolu-
tion in the process of chemical industrialization, with the production of artificial soda
financed by the French bourgeois after the Revolution of 1789. Following the discovery
of the chemical synthesis of soda and the technique for artificially producing it – due to
the extraordinary development of Chemistry during what is called the Chemical Revo-
lution of the eighteenth century – the establishment of factories (of all sizes) that pro-
duced soda accelerated, in Paris, Lyon and other French cities and their suburbs. These
factories generated environmental disorder in their surroundings, with the air in-
tensely polluted by toxic acid gases that corroded walls of buildings, clothes hanging
on clotheslines destroyed, and serious breathing problems caused for those who lived
close to the factories, while in the fields there were great losses of crops. The state of
technological exception that lasted four decades from 1780 to 1810 was resolved partly
with the improvement of the chemical process of soda production that aimed to elimi-
nate the emission of acid gases, and this involved elaborating technical norms of secu-
rity; and partly by the creation of a system for insuring the industrial capital invested
in chemical production, so that the insurance system would be improved parallel to
the advance of technical security regulation. Until the end of the state of technological
exception there continued to be intense environmental pollution in the cities and fields
around the first French industries, and there was intense social and juridical debate
about prohibiting this kind of factory and about indemnities for material, environ-
mental and health harms caused by the chemical production of soda (cf. Fressoz, 2012,
cap. 3-4).
Finally, the same cycle – state-of-technological-exception/consummated-facts/
regulation – was present during the whole nineteenth century with the development of
the steam engine and with the transformation it brought about in the means of indus-
trial production (for example in the mechanization and automation of the textile in-
dustry) and in the means of terrestrial (trains and railroads), fluvial and naval (steam
ships) transport. The whole process of implanting steam technology occurred in a state
of technological exception. This had to do, on the one hand, with the accidents pro-
duced by steam engines, such as the explosions, the avoidance of which eventually was
to depend on the technical development of boilers with internal controls of the pres-
sure of the steam inside of them, and of mechanisms of refrigeration, in order to be
avoided; and, on the other hand, with the huge environmental transformation caused
by the railroad with the beginning of the production of energy by burning fossil
combustibles – first with coal and then coke (cf. Mumford, 2008 [1961], cap. 15; Fressoz,
2012, cap. 5). Here also there was a long process of regulation, maintained partly by the
technical process of improving engine security and partly by insurance for accidents
and indemnities to victims. The combustion engine, the automobile and the highway
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transport deepened the environmental consequences of burning fossil combustibles,
and extended, with respect to their environmental consequences, the state of techno-
logical exception until our own days.
It is not surprising that the process of industrialization of agriculture consoli-
dated in the 1920s with the mechanization of the fields and the advance of monocultures,
and continued in the 1960s with the Green Revolution and the advance of the use of
chemicals in agriculture and, from the 1990s on, with transgenic agriculture, has oc-
curred in a state of technological exception which has endured for almost a century,
and maintained a lasting process of regulation of negative environmental and health
consequences of large technological applications in agriculture. The state of techno-
logical exception seems to be thus intrinsic to the very idea of technological innova-
tion. In Brazil it serves to neutralize social inhibitions in the face of negative environ-
mental and humanitarian consequences, as in the case of hydroelectric plants being
constructed in the north of the country, and of health and environmental consequences,
as in the case of agribusiness, always in accordance with the imperative of moderniza-
tion/development and economic growth. In fact, it permits the exercise of the naked
power, in the Hobbesian sense, because it is the power of the stronger exercised re-
gardless of any social pact in a state of affairs in which the usual and accepted values
and rules are suspended.
4 Technological exception and anti-science practices
The state of technological exception that, as we have seen, is necessary for the develop-
ment of technical innovation practiced by the large pharmaceutical and chemical cor-
porations permits these corporations to develop a political and rhetorical practice that
aims to retard the regulatory process. This practice contributes to prolonging the state
of technological exception – and it is antiscientific. Its unscientific character shows
itself in three ways: (1) by impeding scientific research on the health and environ-
mental effects of pharmaceutical drugs and chemical substances; (2) by deliberately
propagating fraud and ignorance; (3) by continuing to apply and to expand the chemi-
cal biotechnological innovations even after scientific verification that they cause harm
and after their prohibition in certain countries (mainly in Europe).
4.1 The attack on scientific impartiality
The antiscientific attitude is manifested in the fact that pharmaceutical and chemical
corporations normally refuse to furnish the data of the tests on the collateral effects of
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their products carried out in their own laboratories, sometimes even to laboratories
connected with the official regulatory agencies. The corporations justify this by alleg-
ing that openness about their data would undermine the protections that their patents
grant them to maintain secret the constitution of their products (drugs and seeds);
and following this allegation, legal prohibitions and restrictions have been put into
place on the scientific research that may be conducted on, for example, the collateral,
residual and cumulative effects and harms caused by large scale uses of agrotoxics,
and on the effects on health of the prolonged and continued ingestion of GMOs (cf.
Mariconda & Ramos, 2003).
Impeding access to the information about data related to technical solutions,
and prohibiting independent research on its collateral effects obstruct the exercise of
science, are incompatible with the scientific method. They prevent the repetition of
experiments and comparing data obtained in the corporations’ laboratories with those
obtained in other laboratories that may involve, for example, variations of the initial
conditions of dosage and combinations of chemical substances. These impediments
and prohibitions also obstruct experimental research oriented towards the technical
improvement of security norms being a part of the regulatory process. Where they apply
to research on the collateral, residual and unpredictable effects of specialized techno-
logical applications that, as we have seen, generate problems whose solutions can only
be found in other scientific disciplines and in other techniques, it is evident that there
is external interference – in this case, by economic interests – in determining the ob-
jects of scientific research and in applying the scientific method. Thus, we find under-
mined the autonomy of scientific institutions to investigate, using the standard proce-
dures of the scientific method, the efficacy and the limits of technological applications.
 Finally, these impediments and prohibitions introduced in order to maintain
secrecy represent a threat to scientific impartiality, the constitutive value of scientific
method, the one that stipulates that scientific evaluation should be based only on cog-
nitive criteria (cognitive values, such as empirical adequacy, explanatory power, pre-
dictive power, precision, simplicity and comprehensiveness) and the full array of rel-
evant empirical data. The value of impartiality is, thus, intimately linked with
procedures for the scientific certification of hypotheses and theories and confirma-
tion of results, based on methods and procedures universally agreed upon that guar-
antee the objectivity in principle of the knowledge and understanding obtained of phe-
nomena of the world (Lacey & Mariconda, 2012). Because of the secrecy and privacy
that they involve, patents stand opposed to the open and public practices needed to
ensure scientific impartiality: “the institutional conception of science as part of the
public domain is linked with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is
the antithesis of this norm; full and open communication its enactment” (Merton, 2013,
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p. 192; 1957, p. 557). Thus, to impede scientific research based on patent rights amounts
to imposing a scientific moratorium, because effectively “the definition of technology
as ‘private property’ in a capitalistic economy” (Merton, 2013, p. 193; 1957, p. 558) is
incompatible with the value of communalism, for example, with the conception that
the contribution of individual people to scientific knowledge are part of the shared
stock (capital) of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, obstructing scientific scrutiny of
data and research on the collateral, residual, unpredictable, uncertain effects (risks)
etc creates obstacles for developing technical (and also legal) regulations. This
antiscientific behavior is aimed at maintaining the state of technological exception.
4.2 The production of ignorance
The vast agricultural (biotechnological) experiment that is being promoted by
agribusiness with the diffusion of monocultures of GMOs – a clear expression of “ex-
perimenting in every sphere” (see section 2.4 above) – , generates (unpredictable or
undesirable) social, psychological, environmental and ecological externalities (cf.
Martins, 2012, p.110). The change of jargon is intentional, in order to better deal with
the scientific-technological system insofar as it is structured economically, for agri-
business corporations consider the multiple social, etc consequences of large scale
technological applications as externalities, that is, as undesirable effects for which the
revenue of crops and its extraordinary contribution to economic development serve as
sufficient compensation. In the light of the economic criteria of capital and market,
health and environmental consequences and harms are simply the price that society
has to pay for technological progress and economic development.
In order to challenge this, since the effects on health of ingesting GMO food
products are unpredictable in the short term and, being residual and cumulative, will
only be manifested after 30 or 40 years, scientific research needs to be pursued in-
tensely in order to make a more methodical empirical appraisal of the chain of health
and environmental effects triggered by this agricultural experiment. In this way, the
problems of acting without precaution, and of implementing chemical biotechnology
in the shortest possible time, become apparent. The harm caused by industrial
antiscientific practices also becomes evident. These antiscientific practices impede
the scientific appraisal of the consequences triggered by the technology, and hence
risk analysis itself. This appraisal requires that first the residual and cumulative ef-
fects that are propagated through the technological order and its highly artificial envi-
ronment should be investigated; and then the social, health and environmental con-
sequences that follow from these effects and the possible solutions to any problems
that they may cause and, at the same time, to evaluate the development of alternative
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technological solutions to the production of food, such as agroecology, which is poten-
tially highly productive economically.
It is in the context characteristic of the state of technological exception that arises
the second antiscientific practice (with serious ethical consequences) of the deliber-
ate production of error, or “fabricated ignorance” (Martins, 2012, p. 73). Ignorance
has always stood between justice and utility, and claiming to be ignorant of the conse-
quences of practiced acts has always served as an alibi in courts of justice, because where
there is genuine ignorance there is not the ethical intention to perform an evil act. It is
important, however, to distinguish two kinds of ignorance.
On the one hand, there is “genuine ignorance”, that is, that ignorance produced
by technological development (progress) which generates risks and uncertainties that
cannot be eliminated, “not only because we are ignorant of the causal mechanism, but
because no degree of knowledge would be able to eliminate the uncertainties which
follow from the interactions between the new social-technique systems and the bio-
sphere” (Martins, 2012, p. 73). Genuine ignorance is evidently linked to another of
the values that are components of the scientific ethos in Merton’s sense: organized
skepticism, to the demand of detailed critical scrutiny of scientific contributions. This
is a consequence of recognizing the conjectural/hypothetical character of science and
leads to recognizing the fallibility of scientific knowledge; and effectively skepticism
appears as a fundamental characteristic of Popper’s conception that scientific hypoth-
esis (theories) should be submitted to severe and rigorous empirical tests in a context
of comparison with alternative hypothesis or theories (cf. Popper, 1965, cap. 5). For
Merton, organized skepticism is intimately related to the other constitutive values of
scientific ethos: universality, disinterest, originality, communalism, and it is conceived
as “ both a methodological and an institutional mandate” that prescribes “the sus-
pension of judgment until ‘the facts are at hand’” and involves “the detached scrutiny
of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria” (cf. Merton, 2013, p. 197; 1957,
p. 560).
On the other hand, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, “fabricated igno-
rance” has been spreading in “market economies in consolidated democracies”. It con-
sists of
campaigns to produce ignorance (…), doubts, uncertainties concerning well
founded scientific thesis, with spurious arguments, distortions of results, data
from badly conducted research, testimonials presented by specialists in courts
to raise doubts about sound results of scientific investigations (Martins, 2012, p.
173, note 18).
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The campaigns of production of ignorance have occurred repeatedly from the
end of the 1970s – and they have become a common practice of the tobacco industries
(Proctor, 1995),8 petroleum companies and more recently chemical-biotechnological
corporations. They aim to induce ignorance by means of generating doubts on themes
or results about which there is an extensive scientific consensus.9 Thus, despite the
fact that it had been well established scientifically that there are strong statistical cor-
relations between smoking tobacco and occurrence of lung cancer, the tobacco indus-
try was able to postpone regulation of tobacco by means of an organized program aimed
at putting into doubt and discredit scientific evidence about this connection.
One of the significant aims of the program for the production of ignorance is “to
keep the controversy alive” (Leite, 2014, p. 181). It is based on a combined antiscientific
strategy of (1) discrediting (producing false beliefs about) inconvenient scientific data,
by producing other more favorable data (under different initial conditions, with dif-
ferent statistical methods etc.); and (2) defaming the scientific reputations of those
researchers who present scientific evidence verifying the undesirable consequences
of large scale application of particular techniques promoted by multinational corpora-
tions. The evident aim of “to keep the controversy alive” is to impede regulation, pro-
hibitions and restrictions, or to postpone them as long as possible, while maintaining
the state of technological exception. The fact that, in 125 cases brought against tobacco
industry between 1954 and 1979 there was not a single conviction (cf. Leite, 2014, p.
182), proves the advantage for the corporations of maintaining the state of technologi-
cal exception. It also shows that, despite all the impediments and restrictions that,
from the 1990s on, were imposed by the courts on the tobacco industry and smokers,
regulations were not able to be introduced, for example, concerning the composition
of the substances in cigarettes. This is an evident sign that regulatory bodies have in-
corporated tobacco activities into the technological order – by limiting but not essen-
tially modifying them, and that social inhibitions against using tobacco have to a cer-
tain extent been neutralized in the service of economic interests.
The same antiscientific practice reappears in more recent campaigns of the pe-
troleum industry (from 1995 on) that aim to attack the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (cf. Leite, 2014, p. 180-1), by producing doubts about the
anthropic effects of climate change, in particular, the contribution of fossils fuels to
climate change. However, recent discussions about the birth of a new geographical era
– the Anthropocene – in the evolution of the Earth may be an index or an indication
8 In this book Proctor introduced agnotology as a discipline concerned with the production of ignorance; a disci-
pline complementary to epistemology, that is, to the study of knowledge production.
9 I can’t treat here of the role of propaganda and media in the production of biased conceptions, and how this media
device is used in generating fabricated doubt (cf. Ellul, 2014 [1965]).
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that technological environment has attained planetary scale, and that technology now
may represent an important factor having impact on the climate dynamic of the Earth.
Here, in view of the failure of all international attempts until now to set out limits to
the emission of greenhouse gases produced by burning fossils fuels, one can clearly
see that the state of exception is persisting.
The same kind of deliberate fabrication of ignorance occurs in connection with
transgenic agriculture by the six companies – Monsanto (United States), Syngenta
(Suisse), Dupont (United States), Basf (Germany), Bayer (Germany) and Dow (United
States) (cf. Thuswohl, 2013, online) – that dominate the production of GMOs. They use
a double strategy for the deliberate production of error. It involves, on the one hand,
systematically conducting research aiming to challenge scientific data on the harm to
environment and health caused by the extensive use of agrochemicals in agriculture
and of on-going ingestion of GMOs; and, on the other hand, promoting campaigns to
defame individual researchers, and even in some cases taking legal action, citing their
intellectual property rights under patents, to prevent scientific research on the health
and environmental effects of using transgenic plants and consuming their products.
The dissemination of fabricated ignorance deploys rhetorical skepticism against
scientific organized skepticism. Instead of employing doubt to promote knowledge, it
employs it to discredit scientific knowledge in order to disseminate ignorance. The
skeptical procedure of doubting is then used with the deliberate aim of deceiving or
defrauding. In contrast, the conjectural (hypothetical) and fallible character of scien-
tific knowledge – that recognizes that scientific solutions are always subject to change
(in view of knowing more, understanding better, and becoming less ignorant) in the
light of rigorous empirical and conceptual critique and more severe tests based on sci-
entific method – is linked with organized skepticism, one of the component values of
the scientific ethos (cf. Merton, 2013, chap. 7) that is one of the outstanding institu-
tional features of science. Applying the scientific method thus presupposes the accept-
ance of scientific ethos – a set of values of which the value of impartiality is part – and
the practice of the virtues of honesty and sincerity that accompany the scientific use of
method (practiced along with the values of organized skepticism), and respect for the
moral imperatives of not lying about empirical data and evidences, of not using fraudu-
lent research data, of not plagiarizing, etc. Thus, it presupposes certain precise moral
commitments that are denied by the procedure of production of ignorance.
Significantly, creating doubt about scientific certifications, discrediting the le-
gitimacy of security norms indicated by this certification, and postponing the intro-
duction of regulations, maintains the state of technological exception and expands the
range of health and environmental consumed facts. The aim is clear; the means em-
ployed to obtain it is immoral.
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4.3 Ignorance and ethics
The third antiscientific practice consists in de-legitimating scientific decisions, ig-
noring warnings about risks and harms to health and environmental occasioned by
their technical applications, in order to keep the application in place where the state of
technological exception can be maintained. Operating here, the consequence of trans-
gression of the scientific ethos and of the immorality of the employed means, is a sort
of disguising of knowledge or feigning of ignorance. However, to continue the use of
agrochemicals, chemical fertilizers, and transgenic seeds locally in certain countries
when this is already prohibited based on scientific certification of their extensive ge-
netic, teratological, mutational effects etc. – for example, the herbicide 2,4-D (cf.
Neumeister, 2014) – means that the corporations cannot claim ignorance of the con-
sequences of their decisions of applying technical solutions with such known potential
of consequences. Proposals to prohibit planting transgenic seeds and using agroche-
micals that are based on scientific reports that recognize the danger of these effects,
and also their contribution to the present ecological crises. Thus, to continue applying
technical solutions, where there is compelling scientific certification that there are
harmful health and environment consequences and residual effects, is to bring these
harms about deliberately; this can be considered a criminal action. Furthermore, keep-
ing in mind the co-evolution of human beings and their environment (cf. beginning of
section 3 above), and the dependence of human survival on a sustainable environment,
actions that bring about these harms, since they are deliberate, may be considered to
be crimes against humanity: they modify the environment in such a way as to extend to
future generations the harms caused by extensive application of agrochemicals, thereby
decreasing the chances of survival of the human species.
This brings us back to the beginning of the article, to the problem of ethical re-
sponsibility for using such technological practices. Ethical responsibility demands an
understanding of the “relation between personal freedom and the stable order” in view
of the values adopted and of the objective knowledge at hand, both of which – values
and knowledge – compose all of experience. Looked at in this way, actions of corpora-
tions and industries that are decided by a directorate, composed of individuals, cannot
be treated ethically as the actions of a collective juridical personality. Ethical respon-
sibility demands individual (personal) freedom of decision. So from the point of view
of ethical responsibility, that is, of the relation between personal freedom and the so-
cial order, members of a directorate are, first and foremost, individuals – presidents,
directors, scientists, technicians, engineers – to be held individually responsible for
the consequences of decisions in which they are implicated.
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Finally, the whole antiscientific program – undermining scientific impartiality,
deliberately fabricating ignorance, and continuing to use technologies whose harmful
consequences have been confirmed by sound scientific research – deviates from the
scientific ethos, i.e., from the complex of values that has animated modern science. All
of its components are expressions of the antiscientific attitude that animates the pro-
grams of technoscience and technological innovation of the neoliberal economy, and
in line with the neoliberal conception of the minimum state and its program of de-
regulation. Deviating from the scientific ethos in this way has the effect of annulling
the impact of ethics and thus undermining the most basic source of sensitivity to the
requirements for humanity survival.
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